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Note
NLRB Guidelines for Determining
Health Care Industry Bargaining Units:
Judicial Acceptance or Back to the
Drawing Board
INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)1 provides a means
by which employees can establish their right to be represented
collectively in bargaining with their employer concerning the terms
and conditions of employment. 2 An essential aspect of establishing
this right is determining whether a particular group of workers
constitutes an appropriate unit for such representation.3 This deter-
mination is made by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB
or Board) pursuant to the NLRA. Section 9(b) of the NLRA
broadly defines an appropriate collective bargaining unit as one
which "assure[s] to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by ... [the NLRA]."14 Appropriate bargaining
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982) [hereinafter NLRA]. The National Labor Relations Act
in its original form was enacted in 1935 and was commonly known as the Wagner Act. 49
Stat. 449 (1935). It has been amended several times. The statute under which the National
Labor Relations Board currently operates is commonly known as the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, or Taft-Hartley Act, tit. 2, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-
67, 171-97 (1971).
2 NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
3 See NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
4 Id. NLRA section 9(b) provides:
(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall
be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided,
that the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such
purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who
are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employ-
ees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decide that any craft unit is
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units invariably consist of groups of employees with the same or
related job functions such as "all technical employees ' 5 or "all x-
ray technicians." '6 If the Board deems a unit appropriate and a
majority of employees in that unit vote to be represented, then the
employees have established a right to collectively bargain with their
employer.7
In 1974, Congress passed the Health Care Amendments to the
NLRA (Amendments). 8 These Amendments abolished the exclusion
of nonprofit hospitals from NLRA coverage and thereby extended
the NLRB's jurisdiction in the proprietary health care industry to
encompass the nonprofit health care industry as well. 9 The Amend-
-ments also imposed several anti-strike provisions upon collective
bargaining relationships in the health care industry.10 In the Senate
and House committee reports on the legislation, however, Congress
inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been
established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees
in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation[;] or (3) decide
that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with
other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce against
employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to
protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises; but no labor organ-
ization shall be certified as the representative of employees in a bargaining
unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated
directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to membership, em-
ployees other than guards.
E.g., Extendicare of West Virginia v. NLRB, 203 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1973).
E.g., Woodland Park Hospital v. NLRB, 205 N.L.R.B. 888 (1973).
7 NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
8 Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395, amending 29 U.S.C. §§
151-68 (1982). For a discussion of the reasons for the initial inclusion and subsequent repeal
of the nonprofit health care industry exemption, see, e.g., Vernon, Labor Relations in the
Health Care Field Under the 1974 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: An
Overview And Analysis, 70 Nw. U.L. Ray. 202, 203-05 (1975).
9 Section 2(2) of the NLRA defines the entities that are "employers" covered by the
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Prior to the 1974 Amendments, § 2(2) excluded from this definition
"any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." Pub. L. No. 93-360 l(a). The 1974
Amendments deleted this exclusion and added subsection (14) to § (2) to include "Health
Care Institutions" as "employers" covered by the Act. "Health Care Institutions" are
defined as "any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization, health
clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care of sick,
infirm, or aged persons." Pub. L. No. 93-360 l(b).
The Board had jurisdiction to determine appropriate bargaining units in the proprietary
health care industry prior to the 1974 Amendments. See, e.g., Woodland Park Hosp. v.
NLRB, 205 N.L.R.B. 888 (1973); Extendicare of West Virginia v. NLRB, 203 N.L.R.B.
1232 (1973).
10 Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360 1(e), 88 Stat. 395, amending 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-68 (1982).
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admonished the Board to prevent the undue proliferation of bar-
gaining units in the health care industry."
Fifteen years after passage of the amendments and after an
extended notice and comment period, 12 the Board has issued its
final rules for bargaining unit determinations in the health care
field (Rules). 3 Previously, the Board had not flexed its statutory
rulemaking muscle 4 to establish guidelines for the determination of
appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry or other
industries.'s In fact, the Board has acknowledged that this is its
"first venture in major, substantive rulemaking.' 16
The Rules' substantive provisions mark a drastic departure from
the Board's traditional case-by-case method of making bargaining
unit determinations. The Rules establish eight health care bargaining
units, and the Board will sanction only one or more of these eight
units for collective bargaining in the industry, absent special circum-
" S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 607 (1974). See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
,1 The evidence received by the Board at the hearings and during the comment
period substantially exceeded, in both detail and exhaustiveness, what the
Board had expected. The transcript of hearing totals 3545 pages, and the 144
individuals who came in person to testify included employees from virtually
every broad classification under consideration.... In addition, during the
comment period, the Board received written comments from 315 individuals
and organizations, representing diverse points of view and offering information
to supplement what the Board had learned from the oral testimony. These
comments alone totalled approximately 1500 pages.
Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900 (1988). For a compilation of
organizations that participated in the comment process, see id. The First Notice of the
Proposed Rulemaking was given on July 2, 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987). The comment
period, originally to last through October 30, 1987, was extended several times at the request
of interested parties. See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900 (1988). A Second Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking was issued on September 1, 1988, following revisions of the originally proposed
rules. Id. This comment period ended October 17, 1988.
,1 The final rules were issued April 21, 1989, effective May 22, 1989. See 54 Fed.
Reg. 16,336 (1989).
11 The Board's rulemaking authority is provided for in section 6 of the NLRA: "The
Board shall have the authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the
manner prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, such Rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 156.
1, The failure of the Board to exercise its rulemaking powers in this area has been
greatly criticized by commentators. See Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House-Can an Old
Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DmEo L. Rav. 9, 27 (1987); Subrin, Conserving Energy
at the Labor Board: The Case for Making Rules on Collective Bargaining Units, 32 LAB.
L.J. 105, 107 (1982); Peck, The Atrophied Rule Making Powers of the NLRB, 70 YALE
L.J. 729 (1961).
16 54 Fed. Reg. 16,339 (1989).
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stances. 17 The Board asserts three reasons for resorting to rulemak-
ing in this instance:
17 The Rules provide in full:
§ 103.30 Appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry.
(a) This portion of the rule shall be applicable to acute care hospitals, as
defined in paragraph (f) of this section: Except in extraordinary circumstances
and in circumstances in which there are existing non-conforming units, the
following shall be appropriate units, and the only appropriate units, for
petitions filed pursuant to section 9(c)(l)(A)(i) or 9(c)(l)(B) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, except that various combinations of units
may also be appropriate:
(1) All registered nurses.
(2) All physicians.
(3) All professionals except for registered nurses and physicians.
(4) All technical employees.
(5) All skilled maintenance employees.
(6) All business office clerical employees.
(7) All guards.
(8) All nonprofessional employees except for technical employees, skilled
maintenance employees, business office clerical employees, and guards. Pro-
vided That a unit of five or fewer employees shall constitute an extraordinary
circumstance.
(b) Where extraordinary circumstances exist, the Board shall determine
appropriate units by adjudication.
(c) Where there are existing nonconforming units in acute care hospitals,
and a petition for additional units is filed pursuant to sec. 9(c)(1)(A)(i) or
9(c)(l)(B), the Board shall find appropriate only units which comport, insofar
as practicable, with the appropriate unit set forth in paragraph (a) of this
section.
(d) The Board will approve consent agreements providing for elections
in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section, but nothing shall preclude
regional directors from approving stipulations not in accordance with para-
graph (a), as long as the stipulations are otherwise applicable.
(e) This rule will apply to all cases decided on or after May 22, 1989.
(f) For purposes of this rule, the term:
(1) "Hospital" is defined in the same manner as defined in the Medicare
Act, which definition is incorporated herein (currently set forth in 42 U.S.C.
1395x(e), as revised 1988);
(2) "Acute care hospital" is defined as: either a short term care hospital
in which the average length of patient stay is less than thirty days, or a short
term care hospital in which over 50% of all patients are admitted to units
where the average length of patient stay is less than thirty days. Average
length of stay shall be determined by reference to the most recent twelve
month period preceding receipt of a representation petition for which data is
readily available. The term "acute care hospital" shall include those hospitals
operating as acute care facilities even if those hospitals provide such services
as, for example, long term care, outpatient care, psychiatric care, or rehabil-
itative -care, but shall exclude facilities that are primarily nursing homes,
primarily psychiatric hospitals, or primarily rehabilitation hospitals. Where,
after issuance of a subpoena, an employer does not produce records sufficient
for the Board to determine the facts, the Board may presume the employer is
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First, rulemaking will reduce the need for lengthy and costly case-
by-case adjudication of bargaining unit issues, and thus will pro-
vide more predictability for employers and labor organizations
while easing the drain on the resources of the Board and all
parties. Second, it will enable the Board to profit from empirical
evidence (usually not presented in adjudicatory proceedings) as to
the types of unit configurations that would or would not lead to
unwarranted unit proliferation. Finally, the multiplicity of differ-
ing views among the various courts of appeal engenders little
confidence that case-by-case adjudications ever will produce a
single test or method of analysis that will withstand judicial scru-
tiny.'8
This Note primarily focuses upon the last reason given by the
Board, though a brief treatment of the first two reasons will analyze
the Rules' strengths and weaknesses in achieving these ends.
With respect to the first reason, as Burton Subrin, NLRB
Director of Representation Appeals, has pointed out, rulemaking
should save a significant amount of expense and delay in organi-
zation and litigation since the parties will know in advance whether
a particular type of unit is appropriate. This, in turn, should lead
to more stipulated units and, therefore, fewer cases requiring deci-
sions by regional directors, the Board, and the courts, resulting in
the further conservation of time, expense, and-Board resources. 19
The Rules, however, contain two glaring loopholes that parties
potentially could use to impose upon an adverse party the same
expense and delay inherent in the traditional case-by-case determi-
nation format.
an acute care hospital.
(3) "Psychiatric hospital" is defined in the same manner as defined in
the Medicare Act, which definition is incorporated herein (currently set forth
in 42 U.S.C. 1395x(O).
(4) The term "rehabilitation hospital" includes and is limited to all
hospitals accredited as such by either Joint Committee on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations or by Commission for Accreditation of Rehabilita-
tion Facilities.
(5) A "non-conforming unit" is defined as a unit other than those
described in paragraphs (a)(1) through (8) of this section or a combination
among those eight units.
(g) Appropriate units in all other health care facilities: The Board will
determine appropriate units in other health care facilities, as defined in section
2(14) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by adjudication.
54 Fed. Reg. 16,347-48 (1989) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30).
,' St. Vincent Hosp., 285 N.L.R.B. 64, 125 L.R.R.M. No. 1329 (1987). See also 52
Fed. Reg. 25, 143-44 (1987); 53 Fed. Reg. 33,901 (1988).
19 Subrin, supra note 15, at 108.
1989-901
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The first loophole is an "extraordinary circumstances" clause,
which allows parties to challenge the Rules' applicability in partic-
ular situations. 20 Though the Board indicates that it will construe
this exception narrowly to preclude the opportunity for unnecessary
litigation and concommitant delay,21 the exception nevertheless ex-
ists and is subject to abuse. As this Note will illustrate, the Board
has a constitutional and statutory duty to consider each and every
claim of "extraordinary circumstances." 22
Another loophole presented by the Rules is an opportunity for
parties to litigate the scope of the Rules' eight appropriate units.
For example, the Rules provide no insight regarding what differ-
entiates "all technical employees" from "all skilled maintenance
employees" (two of the Rules' units) in terms of job function. Past
Board decisions give some guidance, but gray areas continue to
exist that can be resolved only through case-by-case adjudication
or further rulemaking.
The Board's second purpose for engaging in rulemaking seems
to have been accomplished. The Board was overwhelmed with
evidence concerning unit configurations that would or would not
lead to unwarranted unit proliferation, as summarized in its second
notice of proposed rulemaking.23 However, "unwarranted unit pro-
liferation" is such an amorphous term that the courts, or indeed
Congress, could well reach different conclusions as to whether the
Rules' eight bargaining units constitute "unwarranted" prolifera-
tion. This Note, to a limited extent, will further expand upon this
point.24
Regarding the third reason the Board has given for engaging in
rulemaking, the Board has stated:
Since 1974, when Congress extended the protection of the National
Labor Relations Act to nonprofit hospitals, the Board has taken
literally hundreds of thousands of pages of testimony in a myriad
of litigated cases regarding particular circumstances at various
health care facilities. Nonetheless, to this day there is no one,
generally phrased test for determining appropriate units in this
industry that has met with success in the various circuit courts of
20 See supra note 17, at § 103.30(b).
21 See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,932 (1988) and 54 Fed. Reg. 16,344-45 (1989).
22 See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
23 See supra note 12; 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900-01 (1988). See also 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336-37
(1989).
24 See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
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appeal, and, unfortunately, parties have no clear guidance as to
what units the Board and courts will ultimately find appropriateY
This Note focuses upon the Board's dilemma outlined above
and the extent to which, if any, the Rules will be successful in
establishing guidelines for health care bargaining unit determina-
tions that will meet with general, if not unanimous, circuit court
approval. In Part I, this Note reviews how the Board presently
resolves disputes regarding the appropriateness of a health care unit
for which a representation petition has been filed.2 This section
then demonstrates how the Rules affect this status quo.27 Part II
assesses the Rules' validity, a prerequisite to judicial acceptance, in
light of the NLRA and the legislative history behind the 1974
amendments.n Part III evaluates the Rules' prospects for uniform
circuit court approval. 29 In conclusion, this Note suggests measures
which would facilitate unanimous judicial approval of the Rules. 0
I. THE BARGAINING UNIT DETERMINATION PROCESS STATUS Quo
A. The Representation Procedure
Presently, bargaining unit determinations are made on a case-
by-case basis by the Board based upon the weight of evidence
received at a representation hearing. A representation hearing is
convened by a representative of the Board in part to consider an
"RC" petition." An "RC" petition is a petition filed with the
Board by a union or a group of employees which alleges that a
52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987) (emphasis added).
2 See infra notes 31-63 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 85-203 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 204-32 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
31 See NLRA § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1). Election petitions filed by unions
seeking to organize employees or to replace an incumbent union pursuant to § 9(c)(1)(A)(i)
are identified and docketed by the Board as "RC" petitions. Representation hearings also
are held to consider petitions filed by employees or by a union on behalf of employees who
seek to decertify an incumbent union ("RD" petitions) pursuant to § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii) and
petitions filed by employers who have been confronted with a union demand for recognition
or who seek to oust an incumbent union ("RM" petitions) pursuant to § 9(c)(1)(B). J.
Freerick, H. Baer & J. Arfa, NLRB Representation Elections-Law, Practice & Procedure,
147-55, 165 (1979). For a discussion of other petitions considered at representation hearings,
see id. at 155-65.
1989-901
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substantial number of employees32 wish to be represented for col-
lective bargaining purposes and that their employer refuses to rec-
ognize their representative. 3  At the representation hearing, the union
and the employer can litigate the appropriateness of the unit de-
scribed in the petition. 34
The Board's determination of what group of employees consti-
tutes an appropriate unit35 can be of critical importance to union
organization success or failure. Studies show that there is a definite
correlation between the size of the unit deemed appropriate and
union election success. 36 That is, the narrower the unit, such as all
registered nurses as opposed to all professionals, the better the
probability of union success. 37 As a result, in general, labor unions
request narrower bargaining units and employers request broader
bargaining units.38
B. Determining "Appropriateness"
Since 1936, the Board has interpreted the definition of a "unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining" under section
9(b) of the NLRA39 to require a "community-of-interests" among
all employees in the unit.40 The criteria applied by the Board in
32 A substantial number of employees is defined as 30% of the requested unit. Such
a required showing must be evidenced by union authorization cards signed by 30% of the
requested unit's employees. NLRB, STATEMENT OF PROCEDURE § 101.18. See generally
Freerick, supra note 31, at 167.
33 See NLRA § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1).
3' Id.
31 The Board does not have to choose the union's or the employer's requested unit.
The Board is free to determine its own appropriate unit. Furthermore, the Board's respon-
sibility is not to choose the most appropriate bargaining unit, but to assure that the unit in
question is appropriate under the circumstances. NLRB v. Southern Metal Serv., Inc., 606
F.2d 512, 514 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777, 782
(1952); 15 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 39 (1950).
6 See, e.g., I LAB. REL. WEEK 1017 (1987) (study shows that unions' success dimin-
ishes significantly as bargaining unit size increases); Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B.
at 773 (study shows that unions generally are more successful winning elections in narrower
units than in broader ones).
31 Id.
11 "Labor organizations generally have urged the creation of more separate bargaining
units than have health care employers. Narrow units usually increase the success of organ-
ization efforts and decrease conflict within unit membership during collective bargaining."
Bumpass, Appropriate Bargaining Units in Health Care Institutions: An Analysis of Con-
gressional Intent and Its Implementation by the National Labor Relations Board, 20 B.C.L.
REv. 867, 869 n.10 (1979).
19 See supra note 4.
40 See, e.g., In re Chrysler Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 164, 169-70 (1936); In re Int'l Mercantile
Marine Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 384, 388-90 (1936); In re Int'l Filter Co., I N.L.R.B. 489, 494
(1936).
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ascertaining a "community-of-interests" include, but are not limited
to, "similarity of wages and hours, extent of common supervision,
frequency of contact with other employees, degree of interchange
and functional integration with other employees, and area practice
and patterns of bargaining. ' 41 If such criteria are established at the
representation hearing, separate representation is warranted.4 2
After passage of the 1974 Amendments, the Board began to
apply this test to the nonprofit health care industry 3 and continued
to do so without interruption until its decision in St. Francis L" In
St. Francis 1, a 1982 decision, the Board adopted a new two-tier
approach to determining appropriate bargaining units in the health
care industry.45 Under this approach, seven basic employee groups4
were regarded as potentially appropriate health care units. If a
requested unit fit within one of these groupings, the Board then
applied the various "community-of-interests" criteria to determine
whether the requested unit in fact constituted an appropriate unit.47
If a petition requested a unit smaller than one of the seven identified
groups, it would be dismissed absent a showing of extraordinary
circumstances.48
The Board switched to this two-tier approach largely in response
to a Third Circuit ruling that the legislative intent behind the 1974
Amendments, in particular the congressional admonition to prevent
the proliferation of health care units, precluded the Board from
relying solely on its traditional "community-of-interests" test in
making health care unit determinations. 49 Instead, the court held,
Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 239 N.L.R.B. 872, 873 (1978), enforcement denied
on other grounds, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979). See also 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 132-40 (1937).
The Board's application of the "community-of-interests" criteria has varied with the type
of industry or plant at issue. See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 911
(1981).
See American Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. at 910.
See, e.g., St. Catherine's Hosp. v. NLRB, 217 N.L.R.B. 787, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1070 (1975); Newington Children's Hosp. v. NLRB, 217 N.L.R.B. 793, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1108 (1975); Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 217 N.L.R.B. 797, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1082
(1975). The criteria already had been applied to the proprietary health care industry. See
supra note 9.
- 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1153 (1982).
4 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1160-61.
16 These seven classifications were physicians, registered nurses, other professionals,




,9 St. Francis I, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1154-55.
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reaffirming an earlier decision, a balancing of the "community-of-
interests" criteria with the public's interest in undue proliferation
was required.50
Two years later in St. Francis 1I,s1 the Board reconsidered its
two-tier approach announced in St. Francis I, an approach which
had yet to be reviewed by the circuit courts, and adopted a "dis-
parity-of-interests" test in its place.52 This test presumes that only
two units are appropriate (all professionals and all nonprofessionals)
unless sharper than usual disparities between the wages, hours, and
working conditions of the requested employees and those in an
overall professional or nonprofessional unit are demonstrated.53 The
Board made the switch after further reflection on the congressional
intent behind the 1974 Amendments, concluding that the "disparity-
of-interests" test was in order because "[r]equiring greater dispar-
ities in the usual community-of-interests elements to accord health
care employees separate representation must necessarily result in
fewer units and will thus reflect meaningful application of the
congressional injunction against unit fragmentation. 5 4
Practically speaking, however, adoption of the "disparity-of-
interests" test was the consequence of a change in Board
membership55 and a reaction to the Ninth and Tenth Circuit rulings
that the Board must apply the "disparity-of-interests" test.5 6 Even
before St. Francis II, however, several circuit courts had expressly
rejected this new test,5 7 and today most circuit courts still require
'o Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 608 F.2d 965, 966-67 (3d Cir. 1979).
" 271 N.L.R.B. No. 160 (1984), 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1465 (1984).
52 St. Francis II, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1468-69. In St. Francis I, Board Chairman Van de
Water and member Hunter dissented on the ground that the legislative history behind the
1974 Amendments mandated a "disparity-of-interests" test. St. Francis 1, 112 L.R.R.M. at
1162-75.
5Id.
14 Id.; "Requiring greater disparities in the usual community-of-interest elements to
accord health care employees separate representation must necessarily result in fewer units
and will thus reflect meaningful application of the congressional injunction against unit
fragmentation." Id.
11 St. Francis I was decided by former Board Chairman Van de Water, and members
Fanning, Jenkins, Zimmerman and Hunter. 112 L.R.R.M. 1153. St. Francis II was decided
by Board Chairman Dotson, and members Zimmerman, Hunter and Dennis. 116 L.R.R.M.
1465.
56 See NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 419 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. HMO
Int'l, 678 F.2d 806, 812 n.17 (9th Cir. 1982); Southwest Community Health Serv. v. NLRB,
726 F.2d 611, 613 (10th Cir. 1984).
11 See Masonic Hall v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 636 (2d Cir. 1983); Watonwan Memorial
Hosp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Walker County Medical
Center, Inc., 722 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1984).
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only the traditional "community-of-interests" test to be balanced
with the congressional admonition.-8 Reflecting upon these divergent
circuit court rulings, Board member Dennis, in her dissent to St.
Francis II, stated:
By today's decision.., the majority has demonstrated the futility
of this Board's attempts to resolve this issue through traditional
case-by-case adjudication. Rulemaking could provide an accepta-
ble and feasible means to end the 10-year controversy. It would
give the Board a chance to evaluate the industry's experiences
under the law and to end the uncertainty over how to implement
the congressional injunction against unit proliferation. 9
The futility referred to by Dennis was made more apparent when
the D.C. Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order in St. Francis
II.60 In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 474
v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit held that the Board improperly adopted
the "disparity-of-interests" test and therefore still must apply the
"community-of-interests" criteria.6 1 As discussed below, this vari-
ance in circuit court holdings is attributable entirely to differing
interpretations of the legislative intent behind the 1974 Amend-
ments.6 7
The D.C. Circuit's refusal to enforce St. Francis II was the
straw that broke the proverbial camel's back. Less than two months
after Electrical Workers, the Board voted in favor of engaging in
informal rulemakingY3
C. A New Standard for Determining Appropriate Health Care
Bargaining Units-The Rules
The Rules, which are applicable only to acute care facilities, 4
provide that only the following units will be appropriate for peti-
tions filed pursuant to section 9(c)(1)(A)(i) or section 9(c)(1)(B) of
the NLRA,65 except that various combinations of units also may be
appropriate:6
5s See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
116 L.R.R.M. at 1475.
60 See Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
61 814 F.2d 697, at 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See infra note 190.
62 See infra notes 144-98 and accompanying text.
61 Electrical Workers was decided March 20, 1987. The Board voted in favor of
informal rulemaking on May 15, 1987. See supra note 10.
14 See supra note 17, at § 103.30(a).
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1).
66 See supra note 17, at § 103.30(a). For the Rules' treatment of non-conforming
stipulations, see § 103.30(d).
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(1) all registered nurses.67
(2) all physicians.6 1
(3) all professionals except registered nurses and physicians.6 9
(4) all technical employees.70
(5) all skilled maintenance employees'.7
(6) all business office clerical employees. 72
(7) all guards. 73
(8) all nonprofessional employees except technical employees,
skilled maintenance employees, business office clerical employees,
and guards.7 4
The Rules also contain an "extraordinary circumstances"
exception 75 to avoid unjust application of the Rules to uniquely
situated acute care hospitals. 76 The Board has indicated, however,
that it will construe this exception narrowly. 77 To qualify for the
"extraordinary circumstances" exception, a party has the heavy
burden of demonstrating that "its arguments are substantially dif-
ferent from those which have been carefully considered at the
rulemaking proceeding. "78
To illustrate the mechanics of the Rules and its exception, if a
union petitioned the Board for a requested unit of "all registered
nurses," the issue of appropriateness would not be litigated at the
representation hearing because the unit already has been deemed
appropriate by the Rules. That is, unless the employer wishes to
claim that extraordinary circumstances require that a unit of "all
professionals" is appropriate. If the employer so chooses, the em-
ployer then would have to present evidence to the hearing officer
67 For a summary of the record that the Board relied upon in determining that all
registered nurses" was an appropriate unit, see Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
53 Fed. Reg. at 33,911-17 (1988).
" Id. at 33,917.
Id. at 33,917-18.
70 Id. at 33,918-20.
71 Id. at 33,920-24.
72 Id. at 33,924-27.
71 § 9(b)(3) of the NLRA requires that guards be placed in a separate bargaining unit.
See supra note 4.
- "Based on our analysis of the evidence adduced, we have found appropriate separate
units of technicals, business office clericals, and skilled maintenance employees. All remain-
ing service and non-professional employees [except guards] shall, therefore, constitute a
separate appropriate unit, where requested." (footnotes omitted). 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,927.
11 See supra note 17, at § 103.30(c).
76 53 Fed. Reg. 33,901, 33,932 (1988).
- Id.
79 Id. at 33,933.
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demonstrating such extraordinary circumstances,7 9 although the
hearing officer would not be required to consider this evidence. The
hearing officer can accept or reject the evidence, or, as the Board
anticipates will happen far more frequently, refer the matter to the
regional director for a ruling.80 If the regional director decides that
such evidence already has been weighed during the rulemaking
proceedings, the evidence will not be considered.8 1 The regional
director's determination can be appealed to the Board. 82 On the
other hand, if the regional director determines that the evidence
demonstrates "unusual and unforeseen deviations from the range
of circumstances revealed at the [rulemaking] hearings" such that
"it would be unjust or an abuse of discretion'for the Board to
apply the rules to the facility involved," then the regional director
will not apply the Rules. 83 Instead, the parties then would be forced
to present evidence at the representation hearing, as if the Rules
had not been adopted. However, the Rules neglect to state which
of the pre-Rule standards will govern the hearing. 84
II. THE VAL rrY oF THE RuL.ES 85
A. Section 9(b) of the NLRA
Administrative agencies can adopt substantive rules through one






84 The "disparity-of-interests" standard most probably would be used, as this was the
standard employed immediately before the adoption of the Rules. See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,931
(1988); see also St. Vincent Hosp., 125 L.R.R.M. 1329, 1331 (1987) (the "disparity-of-
interests" test is to be used until the Rules become effective).
11 A prerequisite to uniform judicial acceptance of the guidelines for unit determina-
tions created by the Rules is the validity of the Rules themselves. Consequently, this section
assesses the Rules' validity in light of section 9(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1973),
and the legislative history behind the 1974 Amendments.
This Note is limited in this regard due to considerations of brevity and because the
Rules' validity seem most suspect with respect to these two issues. As far as compliance
with the Administrative Procedure Act is concerned, the Board has complied with all of
the requirements for agency informal rulemaking set out in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1973).
A proper notice of proposed rulemaking was published in the Federal Register, (52 Fed.
Reg. 25,142 (1987)), and interested parties were invited to submit written data and views.
Id. The Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking evidences the Board's consideration of the
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rulemaking.16 Previously, the Board promulgated collective bargain-
ing unit rules through adjudication.8 7 However, the Supreme Court
held that, as long as the rule is consistent with the various provisions
of the NLRA,88 the ultimate choice between deciding an issue
through adjudication or Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking
is within the Board's informed discretion.8 9 Because the Rules at
issue deal with appropriate bargaining unit determinations, the Rules
must be in conformity with section 9(b) of the NLRA, which confers
authority upon the Board to determine appropriate bargaining units.
If the Rules are not in conformity, then a court must either set
aside a bargaining unit determined appropriate pursuant to the
Rules9° or find the Rules themselves void as an unlawful exercise
of agency discretion. 91
Section 9(b) of the NLRA provides: "The Board shall decide
in each case.., the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining ... ."92 This language must be reconciled with the Rules'
provision that there are eight pre-determined appropriate bargaining
units and that no petition for organization will be entertained that
does not request such a unit, unless extraordinary circumstances
are shown.93 As demonstrated below, the Rules' bargaining unit
determination process is consistent with section 9(b) and, at least
to this extent, the Rules are valid.
There is no direct authority for the proposition that the Rules
are consistent with section 9(b). Neither the legislative history94 nor
relevant matters presented during the rulemaking proceedings and also contains a concise
general statement of the Rules' basis and purpose. See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900 (1988). The
APA does not mandate a formal hearing unless required by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), and
the NLRA imposes no such requirement. See 29 U.S.C. § 156, supra note 11; 5 U.S.C. §
553(c).
29 U.S.C. §§ 501-65, 701-06 (1982).
See, e.g., Appalachian Shale Products Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958); Excelsior
Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966); Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429
(1953).
m See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978).
, E.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); NLRB v. Children's Baptist Home, 576 F.2d 256, 260 (9th
Cir. 1978).
90 Cf. Allied Chem. and Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 170-72 (1971).
91 See 29 U.S.C. § 706(1)(H).
See NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
91 See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
14 See generally LEGisLATIvr HISTORY OF THE LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, Vol. I and
II (1985); LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, Vol. I
and 11 (1985).
[VOL. 78
1989-901 HEALTH CA Ax BARGAINING UNITs
the U.S. Supreme Court95 have indicated whether the "in each
case" language of section 9(b) precludes the use of rules to deter-
mine bargaining units. Moreover, a strong argument can be made
that the Rules are adverse to section 9(b).
Such an argument begins with the premise that the language of
section 9(b) is mandatory and conclusive. Section 9(b) is mandatory
in the sense that it reads, "[tihe Board shall decide in each
case .... "96 Moreover, this language should be afforded its plain
meaning absent a clearly expressed, conclusive legislative intent to
the contrary. 97 Such legislative intent is absent;98 therefore, this
language is conclusive and mandatory.
The Rules conflict with the language of section 9(b), in that,
under the Rules, bargaining units are not determined in each case,
but are pre-determined through the rulemaking process. Thus, the
Rules are further inconsistent with section 9(b) in that they preclude
the Board from exercising its specialized decisional function. This
function, peculiar to case-by-case analysis, 99 "assure[s] to employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by [the
NLRA]." 1 As stated by Board member Johansen in opposition to
adoption of the Rules:
" In Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), the Supreme Court
interpreted section 9(b), stating:
The issue as to what unit is appropriate for bargaining is one for which no
absolute rule of law is laid down by statute, and none should be by decision.
It involves of necessity a large measure of informed discretion and the decision
of the Board, if not final, is rarely to be disturbed. While we do not say that
a determination of a unit of representation cannot be so unreasonable and
arbitrary as to exceed the Board's power, we are clear that the decision in
question does not do so. That settled, our power is at an end.
Id. at 491-92. However, the passage never has been viewed as a direct reference to section
9(b)'s "in each case" language. Rather, this quote invariably is relied upon as authority for
the proposition that the Board has broad discretion in determining appropriate bargaining
units. See, e.g., South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
425 U.S. 800, 805 (1976); Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450,
454 (10th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 214 (7th Cir. 1978).
NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (emphasis added).
97 See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980).
9 See supra note 94.
" 53 Fed. Reg. 33,935 (1988) (Board member Johansen dissenting).
-- NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). These rights include
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist organization ... [and] the
right to refrain from any or all such activities. Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157. And of course, the Board should exercise its authority under section 9(b)
in such a way as to effectuate the Act's general purpose of minimizing industrial
strife by encouraging collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
Sheraton-Kauai Corp. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1970).
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The Board cannot satisfactorily fulfill its statutory obligation °10 by
relegating its specialized decisional function in this area to rule-
making procedures .... Had Congress intended that the Board
abandon the decisional approach and utilize a wholly new proce-
dure for determining appropriate [bargaining] units in the health
care industry, Congress would have told us so explicitly. It did
not.' 2
The more compelling position, however, is advanced by Profes-
sor Kenneth Culp Davis, a leading scholar of administrative law. 103
As relied upon by the Board0 4 and buttressed by federal case law,
Davis' position is that the Rules are consistent with section 9(b).
Davis' argument illustrates the compatibility of the Rules with
section 9(b) and highlights the shortcomings that undermine the
opposing position.
According to Professor Davis, section 9(b)'s "in each case"
language does not preclude the Board's use of precedent and clas-
sifications to decide appropriate bargaining units in each case. 05 As
Professor Davis stated:
[T]he Board may decide "in each case" with the help of such
classifications, rules, principles and precedents as it finds useful.
The mandate to decide "in each case" does not prevent the Board
from supplanting the original discretionary chaos with some degree
of order, and the principal instruments for regularizing the system
of deciding "in each case" are classifications, rules, principles,
and precedents. Sensible men could not refuse to use such instru-
ments and a sensible Congress would not expect them to.1 6
Therefore, according to Professor Davis, Rules are acceptable
and, in fact, are to be encouraged, if they merely regulate the
system of deciding "in each case." Such is the case with the Rules
under consideration. The appropriateness of the eight units pre-
scribed by the Rules is presumptive, not absolute; there is the
possibility "in each case" for the presumption to be rebutted through
101 To "assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by
[the NLRA]." NLRA § 9(b).
101 53 Fed. Reg. 33,935 (1988).
103 See, e.g., K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATvE LAW (6th ed. 1977); K. DAVIS, ADMINIsTRATIVE
LAW AND GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1975); K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT (3d ed. 1972).
104 See 52 Fed. Reg. 25,144 (1987); 53 Fed. Reg. 33,901 (1988) (Board's analysis of
the validity of the Rules in light of section 9(b)).
305 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, supra note 103, at 145.
106 Id.
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a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Hence, notwithstanding
the presumption, the result must be weighed separately "in each
case." Consequently, by merely establishing rebuttable presump-
tions of appropriateness, the Rules are in accord with section 9(b).
Federal circuit court case law supports Professor Davis' liberal
interpretation of 9(b).10 7 In Big Y Foods v. NLRB, 0° petitioner
refused to recognize meat department employees as a bargaining
unit even though the Board had determined the unit appropriate. °9
In making its determination, the Board had employed a presump-
tion that a "separate meat department unit" is appropriate in a
grocery store."10 The Board found that the petitioner failed to rebut
this presumption."' The First Circuit upheld use of the rebuttable
presumption, specifically addressing section 9(b)'s "in each case"
language:
The only pertinent limitation [on the Board's broad discretion to
decide appropriate units] is the § 9(b) statutory direction to the
NLRB to make a decision "in each case." It has been held that
that statutory direction invalidates a conclusive presumption be-
cause it precludes the NLRB from making a determination based
upon the unique circumstances of a particular group of employees.
But that statutory direction does not invalidate a rebuttable pre-
sumption which has no such preclusive effect.1 2
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Board's use of a rebutt-
able presumption that separate craft units in the lumber industry
are inappropriate,"' and stated in dictum that "certain [section
9(b)] presumptions may be employed by the Board so long as
interested parties are given the opportunity to effectively present
evidence to rebut the presumption. 11 4 The Seventh Circuit im-
pliedly approved the use of section 9(b) presumptions when it
suggested that the Board could and should exercise its dormant
rulemaking powers in carrying out its section 9(b) duties." 5
107 See Big Y Foods v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1981).
10 651 F.2d 40 (Ist Cir. 1981).
,"9 Id. at 43.
11 Id. at 45.
'" Id.
112 Id. at 45-46 (citation omitted).
M See Teamsters Local 690 v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 1967).
"1 NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 416 n.14 (9th Cir. 1979).
M' See Continental Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1093-94 (7th Cir. 1984)
(The Board abruptly and retroactively failed to adhere to its own presumption that units of
pressmen and preparatory employees are appropriate in lithographic plants. In explaining
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Notwithstanding the above, the Board has stated that "We have
decided not to make the units only 'presumptively' appropriate,
because one important advantage of rulemaking is the certainty it
offers .... Though an 'extraordinary circumstances' exception has
been included, it is anticipated that the exception will be little used
and limited to truly extraordinary situations .... 1116 With this
statement the Board probably intended to indicate that the Rules
impose "strong presumptions" as opposed to "mere presumptions"
because the Rules' eight units are "presumptively" appropriate. A
presumption is defined as "a rule of law, statutory or judicial, by
which finding of basic fact gives rise to the existence of presumed
fact, until the presumption is rebutted. 11 7 With respect to the
Rules, the basic facts gathered through the comment process have
given rise to the presumed fact of the appropriateness of eight units,
unless extraordinary circumstances are shown. Therefore, the Rules'
eight units are only presumptively appropriate.
If, however, the Rules' consistency with section 9(b) is premised
upon their equivalence to rebuttable presumptions, then so too must
the Rules satisfy the requirements of valid presumptions under the
NLRA. Board presumptions are subject to judicial review for con-
sistency with the NLRA and for rationality," 8 i.e., a logical con-
nection between what is proved and what is inferred.119
As demonstrated above, the Rules are consistent with the
NLRA. °20 With regard to rationality, there must be a logical con-
nection between the Rules' eight units and their presumed appro-
priateness.' 21 This connection may be proved by factors other than
the testimonial evidence in the case in which the presumption is
used.'12 For example, an NLRB presumption reflecting the Board's
experience in similar cases is likely to be rational because the nexus
between what is assumed and what must be proved has been dem-
its refusal to enforce the Board order, the Seventh Circuit stated that "the Board could
have prevented this surprise by using its dormant rulemaking powers."). See also NLRB v.
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1968) (approving Board's
rebuttable presumption that a single distinct office of employees is an appropriate unit).
116 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987). See also 54 Fed. Reg. 16,338-39.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1067 (5th ed. 1979).
,' See Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 501.
119 See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 804-05 (1945).
120 See supra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
121 See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 33 (1969) (upholding the "rational connec-
tion test" for determining the validity of a statutory presumption).
-- Id. at 32-34 (1969). See also Big Y Foods, 651 F.2d at 46.
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onstrated previously.12 Therefore, as the eight units in the Rules
are the same units the Board has found ultimately appropriate in
hundreds of past representation case proceedings,24 such a logical
connection exists and, hence, the Rules are rational. In addition,
rationality can easily be inferred from the lengthy and exhaustive
record upon which the determinations of appropriateness were
made. 2
Nor does the heavy burden of demonstrating "extraordinary
circumstances" in order to rebut the Rules' presumptions' 26 modify
the above conclusions because, while an interested person must be
afforded an opportunity to rebut a section 9(b) presumption, 27 the
burden of asserting that right can be relatively high.las As one
commentator has stated: "An agency must follow its own rules and
hence one asking it to deviate from an established rule must make
an extraordinary showing." 1 29
Finally, the Rules do not abrogate the Board's duty under
section 9(b) to determine appropriate bargaining units that "assure
to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed
by the . . . [NLRA]."10 The Board is afforded great discretion in
deciding whether a particular unit assures these rights1 3' and the
123 See Big Y Foods, 651 F.2d at 46.
,2, See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,903 (1988).
12 See id. at 33,911-26.
'6 See 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987).
127 See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
' See C. KocH, 1 ADMInSTRATIVE LAW AND PRAcTIcE, § 4.112, p. 322-23 (1985); see
also Indus. Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 437 F.2d 680, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (upholding heavy
burden placed on one seeking to demonstrate that one's arguments are substantially different
from those that were carefully considered at the rulemaking proceeding).
,19 C. KocH, supra note 128, § 4.112, at 323. See, e.g., WAIT Radio v. FCC, 459
F.2d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); Basic Media, Ltd. v. FCC,
559 F.2d 830, 833-34 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
How should the agency respond to such application [for exception]? At the
very least, the APA probably requires a statement of reasons for denial.
Subsection 555(e) requires reasons for denial of any petition and most certainly
applies to petition for waiver or variance. The agency should give evidence
that i. carefully considered all nonfrivolous applications including a meaningful
statement of reasons.
C. KocH, supra note 128, § 4.112, at 323. However, "the agency should only rarely provide
for a hearing on application for waiver or variance. The agency should not be forced to
continuously justify its rules in order to deny an application for a hearing for individual
treatment." Id. The latter is relevant because the Board has indicated that only rarely will
it grant hearings to consider "extraordinary circumstances" claims.
M See NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
131 See, e.g., Packard Motor Co., 330 U.S. at 491-92; South Prairie Const. Co., 425
U.S. at 805; Sheraton-Kauai Corp., 429 F.2d at 1355.
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Board has ascertained through the rulemaking process that the
Rules' eight units do assure these rights. 132 Moreover, the Board
will continue to exercise its "specialized decisional function" when
it considers "extraordinary circumstances" claims.
In summary, the Board is free to decide which method of
determining appropriate units best assures employees their rights
under the NLRA and through which processes of law it is to exercise
its specialized decisional function. This point forms the basis of
Chief Judge Seitz's dissent from the Third Circuit's holding that
section 9(b)'s "in each case" language precludes the Board from
granting comity to state labor board unit determinations. 3 3 Judge
Seitz argued that:
[S]tatutory language directing the Board to determine a particular
issue does not necessarily preclude the Board from relying on
other processes of law, as long as it can assert a sound policy for
doing so.
The Board's interest in determining how it will allocate its
resources so as best to effectuate federal labor policy cannot be
gainsaid.134
Likewise, it cannot be gainsaid that the Board has enunciated sound
policy reasons for engaging in rulemaking, and if the Board has
decided that the Rules will best effectuate federal labor policy, then
it is well within the Board's discretion to use them.
B. The Congressional Admonition Against Undue Proliferation
An assessment of the Rules' validity would be incomplete with-
out an examination of the legislative intent behind the 1974 Amend-
132 The Board is free to rely upon the rulemaking proceedings and the Rules themselves
in indicating that it has exercised its discretion in assuring to employees the rights guaranteed
by the NLRA.
Of course, the Board may articulate the basis of its order by reference to
other decisions or its general policies laid down in its rules and its annual
reports, reflecting its "cumulative experience" ... so long as the basis of the
Board's action, in whatever manner the Board chooses to formulate it, meets
the criteria for judicial review. [NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,] 380
U.S. at 443, note 6, 85 S. Ct. at 1064. (emphasis supplied)
NLRB v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 119, 121 (3d Cir. 1968).
Cf. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,911-26 (compilation of pertinent record relied upon by the Board
in determining the eight units in the Rules assures the rights guaranteed by the NLRA).
1' Memorial Hosp. of Roxborough v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1976) (NLRB
may not delegate its responsibility of determining appropriate bargaining units).
134 Id. at 363.
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ments and its impact upon health care bargaining unit
determinations. 35 In this regard, attention will be focused upon an
issue central to passage of the 1974 Amendments, viz., Congress'
desire to avoid undue fragmentation of bargaining units in the
health care industry, an industry especially susceptible to such frag-
mentation because of its diversity and multiplicity of occupational
classifications. 136
1. The Congressional Concern Over Proliferation
Proliferation concerned many legislators because along with
large numbers of bargaining units came increased strike potential
and jurisdictional disputes which could have devastating effects
upon continuous patient-care.1 37 To a lesser extent, there also was
some concern that wage-competition among the numerous units
might increase the cost of patient care. 3 8 With regards to the
proliferation issue, it is important to note that Congress was not
so much concerned with unit proliferation per se as it was with the
side-effects of such proliferation, such as disruption of patient
care.'
39
Nevertheless, if proliferation could be avoided, so too could its
results. To this end, both the Senate and the House Committee
Reports on the 1974 legislation included this now famous admon-
ishment to the Board: "Due consideration should be given by the
Board to preventing the proliferation of bargaining units in the
health care industry."' 4
,31 Discussions of the legislative history behind the 1974 Amendments can be found at
SENATE SuBcoMMITTEE ON LABOR, Comm. ON LABOR AND PUBLic WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPrrALs UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
AcT, 1974, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (Nov. 1974) 9-10, 104-12, 270-72, 372 [hereinafter LEGIS-
LAT1vE HISTORY]; see also Fehely, Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Health
Care Institutions, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 235 (1975); Bumpass, supra note 38; Vernon, supra
note 8.
"36 See, e.g., LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 135, at 113, 120 CONG. REc. 12,944-45
(May 2, 1974).
Congress was concerned with proliferation in the proprietary as well as the nonprofit
health care industries. (The legislative history addressing the proliferation issue does not
distinguish between proprietary and nonprofit health care facilities).
137 See id.
1' Id.
,"9 See, e.g., Vernon, supra note 8, at 215.
110 S. RPr. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
135, at 12; H. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 607 (1974), LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 135, at 274-75. In connection with this admonition, the House and Senate reports
noted with approval the recent Board decisions in Four Seasons Nursing Center, 208
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The pertinent legislative history reviewed by courts endeavoring
to ascertain the congressional intent behind the Amendments varies
from case to case, but invariably consists of the Committee Reports'
admonition and the following pre-passage statements made by Sen-
ators Taft and Williams, sponsors of the amending legislation.
Senator Taft stated that:
I believe [the committee report] is a sound approach and a
constructive compromise, as the Board should be permitted some
flexibility in unit determination cases. I cannot stress enough,
however, the importance of great caution being exercised by the
Board in reviewing unit cases in this area. Unwarranted unit
fragmentation leading to jurisdictional disputes and work stop-
pages must be prevented.' 4'
At a later date Senator Taft further remarked:
Certainly, every effort should be made to prevent a prolifer-
ation of bargaining units in the health care field and this was one
of the central issues leading to agreement on this legislation. In
this area there is a definite need for the Board to examine the
public interest in determining appropriate bargaining units. 42
Senator Williams commented that "the committee clearly in-
tends that the Board give due consideration to its admonition to
avoid an undue proliferation of units in the health care industry.' 1 43
2. The Congressional Admonition's Impact on Health Care
Bargaining Unit Determinations
The impact of the Committee Reports' admonition upon bar-
gaining unit determinations in the health care industry has been
considerable. As illustrated earlier, 144 the circuit courts' differing
N.L.R.B. 403, 85 L.R.R.M. 1093 (1974) (separate unit of nursing home's maintenance
employees inappropriate); Woodland Park Hosp., 205 N.L.R.B. 888, 84 L.R.R.M. 1075
(1973) (separate unit of x-ray technicians in a single facility hospital inappropriate); Exten-
dicare of West Virginia, 204 N.L.R.B. 1232, 83 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1973) ("[A]ll service and
maintenance employees," "all technical employees," and "all licensed practical nurses"
were found to be appropriate.). With respect to Extendicare, however, the reports cautioned
that the committees did not necessarily approve of the entire decision. Id. In each of these
decisions the Board employed the traditional "community-of-interests" test.
141 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 135, at 113-14, 120 CONG. REc. 12,944-45 (May
2, 1974).
141 Id. at 255, 120 CONG. Rac. 13,559-60 (May 7, 1974).
,41 Mercy Hosp. of Sacremento, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 767 (1975), 120 CONG. REc.
22,949 (July 11, 1974).
I" See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
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perceptions of the admonition and the role it should play in unit
determinations has compelled the Board to apply several different
standards to determine appropriate units in the health care industry.
Thus, indirectly, the admonition ultimately compelled the Board to
engage in rulemaking. 145
Initially, in two decisions less than a year after the passage of
the Amendments, the Board bowed to the will of Congress, as
expressed by the admonition, and took care to avoid the prolifer-
ation of units in the health care industry. In Mercy Hospitals of
Sacramento, Inc.,14 the Board stated that "our consideration of all
issues concerning the composition of appropriate bargaining units
in the health care industry must necessarily take place against this
background of avoidance of undue proliferation."' 147 Similarly, in
Shriners' Hospitals for Crippled Children,'" the Board rejected a
petition for a unit of five stationary engineers because sanctioning
such a unit could "only lead to an undue fragmentation of bar-
gaining units in the health care industry which would totally frus-
trate Congressional intent."' 49
The first federal circuit court presented with the issue, the Third
Circuit in St. Vincent's Hospital v. NLRB, 50 relied on these initial
Board decisions to hold that the mere application of the traditional
"community-of-interests" criteria to decide that licensed boilermen
were entitled to a separate bargaining unit was in conflict with the
congressional admonition and, hence, unenforceable.'-' Instead, the
court held, to be in accord with congressional intent the Board
must factor the public interest in non-proliferation into this tradi-
tional standard, though the court did not state how much weight
should be assigned to this factor.Y2
"4' The Board, in its First Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, explained its dilemma in
this way:
Thirteen years and many hundreds of cases [after passage of the Amendments],
the Board finds that despite its numerous, well-intentioned efforts to carry
out congressional intent through formulation of a general conceptual test, it
is now no closer to successfully defining appropriate bargaining units in the
health care industry than it was in 1974.
52 Fed. Reg. 25,143 (1987).
14 217 N.L.R.B. 765 (1975).
141 Id. at 766.
1 217 N.L.R.B. 806 (1975).
141 Id. at 808.





In NLRB v. West Suburban Hospital,153 the Seventh Circuit
followed the Third Circuit's lead in holding that unit determinations
in the health care field should not be made solely on the basis of
"traditional factors".1 54 The court then took St. Vincent's Hospital
one step further by requiring the Board to indicate the manner in
which its unit determination in each case implements or reflects the
congressional admonition. 55
Presently, every circuit court addressing the issue, save the D.C.
Circuit, has held that "upon penalty of non-enforcement of the
Board's order,"' 56 the Board must balance the traditional "com-
munity-of-interests" criteria (or the "disparity-of-interests" stan-
dard) with the public interest against unit proliferation. 5 7 Most
courts also require the Board to indicate in each case how it has
balanced these competing interests. 58
Board consideration of the admonition is all that these courts
require. Board orders sanctioning narrower health care units have
been enforced where the Board has demonstrated that the public
"' 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 215.
1 5 Id. at 216.
1-6 See, e.g., Mary Thompson Hosp., 241 NLRB No. 766 (1979) (certifying unit of
licensed stationary engineers), enforcement denied, 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1978); Allegheny
Gen. Hosp., 239 N.L.R.B. 872 (1978) (certifying unit of maintenance employees), enforce-
ment denied, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979). The Board has no enforcement powers of its
own. See NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).
17 E.g., NLRB v. Walker County Medical Center, Inc., 722 F.2d 1535, 1538-39 (11th
Cir. 1984); Masonic Hail v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1983); Mary Thompson
Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB,
608 F.2d 965, 968-69 (3d Cir. 1979); Bay Medicai Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174,
1177-78 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979); cf. Watonwan Memorial Hosp.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[Ihe 1974 Amendments require the
Board to consider the congressional directive to avoid unit proliferation in each case
involving health care institutions."); Vicksburg Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1070, 1075
(5th Cir. 1981) ("[I]n finding that a single unit of service, maintenance and technical
employees was appropriate, the regional director and the Board were mindful of the
congressional mandate .... ).
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, require a balance with the "disparity-
of-interests" standard. E.g., Southwest Community Health Servs. v. NLRB, 762 F.2d 611,
613 (10th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. HMO Int'l, 678 F.2d 806, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1982). The D.C.
Circuit is the only circuit that has held otherwise. See Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
"'s E.g., NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1978); accord
Walker County Medical Center, 722 F.2d at 1539; Watonwan Memorial Hosp., 711 F.2d
at 851; NLRB v. Frederick Memorial Hosp., 691 F.2d 191, 194 (11th Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d
404, 416 (9th Cir. 1979); Bay Medical Center, 588 F.2d at 1178.
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interest in broader units was outweighed by other factors. 59 For
instance, the Sixth Circuit enforced the Board's reconfirmation
order of a separate "licensed practical nurses" unit where the
hospital had sought to include them in a unit of "all technical
employees."' 60 The Board, in reconfirming the unit, noted that their
policy against disrupting existing bargaining relationships out-
weighed the public interest in non-proliferation.1 61
Without question, the Committee Reports' admonition and the
corresponding statements of Senators Taft and Williams 62 demon-
strate that Congress intended the Board to consider the public
interest in non-proliferation of health care units. However, there
are two items of legislative history that are highly relevant to
congressional intent with respect to proliferation which remain rel-
atively unexplored by these courts. These items, considered below,
consist of: 1) the Amendment provisions regulating the conduct of
collective bargaining in the health care industry, and 2) Congress'
declination to amend section 9(b).
3. The 1974 Amendment Strike Provisions
The first item overlooked by the courts is the actual statutory
provisions that constitute the bulk of the 1974 Amendments and
the intent behind their passage. Specifically, the 1974 Amendments
impose upon the health care industry elaborate safeguards against
01 See, e.g., NLRB v. Sweetwater Hosp. Ass'n, 604 F.2d 454, 458 (6th Cir. 1979).
However, the court stated in dictum that a Board order that expressly concludes that other
considerations outweigh the policy against proliferation may not be upheld if the unit
amounts to unacceptable fragmentation of health care units. See also Vicksburg Hosp., 653
F.2d at 1075; Watonwan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 711 F.2d at 85 1. But see Frederick Memorial
Hosp., 691 F.2d at 194 (Board reliance upon precedent is insufficient as "due consideration
to the congressional admonition."). But cf. Walker City Medical Center, 722 F.2d at 1539-
40 (Board reliance upon precedent is sufficient as "due consideration.").
Bay Medical Center, 588 F.2d at 1178.
161 Id.
" Both Senators Taft and Williams made reference to NLRB v. Delaware-New Jersey
Ferry Co., 128 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1942), in directing the Board to factor into its unit
determinations the public interest in non-proliferation. See LEaOIsASvE HISTORY, supra note
135, at 362-63, 120 CoNa. REc. 22,949 (July 11, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams). In
Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., the Third Circuit refused to enforce a Board determination
of a combined unit of deck hands and ship officers. In so holding, the court stated:
IT]he point here is not what the officers want, nor what the men want, nor
what the company either wants or is willing to acquiesce in, but rather, what
is the public interest. The Board's duty to serve the public interest cannot be
affected by the desires or acquiescence of the parties.
128 F.2d at 137.
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strikes, as well as regulations affecting the conduct of collective
bargaining in the industry.' 63 These provisions are outlined below:
1) A party who wants to negotiate a new agreement may give
a contract expiration notice to the other party before contract
termination.' 64 These notice provisions are thirty days longer than
comparable requirements instituted in other industries and were
intended to promote continuous patient care service by allowing the
parties an extended period in which to negotiate a new agreement. 165
2) After notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Serv-
ice (FMCS), the parties are obliged to engage in mandatory medi-
ation via the FMCS.' 66
3) Under certain circumstances, the director of the FMCS can
refer contract disputes to a board of inquiry to explore unresolved
issues between the parties and to make recommendations for their
resolution. These boards are to be convened where "a threatened
or actual strike or lock-out . . . will, if permitted to occur or to
continue, substantially interrupt the delivery of health care in the
locality concerned."' 67 Such a board can be convened if mandatory
mediation fails to secure an agreement within thirty days. 68
4) Finally, the union must give ten days advance notice of a
strike at a health care institution to the FMCS and to the institution
itself, a requirement that is unique to the health care industry. 69
As Senator Taft stated, this requirement was included expressly in
order "to give health care institutions sufficient advance notice of
a strike or picketing to permit them to make arrangements for the
continuity of patient care.' '170
These anti-strike motivated provisions, in conjunction with the
provision removing the nonprofit health care industry exemption, 7'
constitute the entirety of the 1974 Amendments. Nevertheless, not
a single federal circuit court has addressed the significance of these
anti-strike provisions to the proliferation issue. At the very least,
these anti-strike provisions evidence a congressional intent to counter
6I See Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395, 396 (amending 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1982)).
" See NLRA § 8(d)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(A).
16 See Vernon, supra note 8, at 210-11.
16 NLRA § 8(d)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d)(C) (Supp. 1975).
161 Labor Management Relations Act § 213, 29 U.S.C. § 183.
168 Id.
16" NLRA § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g).
11o 120 CONG. REc. 6931, 6934 (daily ed. May 2, 1974). For an analysis of these strike
provisions, see Vernon, supra note 8.
7 See supra note 8.
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the potential results of proliferation, i.e., the increased risk of
strikes leading to disruption of patient care, with comprehensive
statutory safeguards. The significance of this congressional intent
will be made clear after examining the second item of legislative
history that remains unexplored by the courts.
4. Congress' Failure to Amend Section 9(b)
There were two committee proposals made to amend section
9(b) and thereby counter potential unit proliferation directly. A
proposal by Senator Taft would have restricted the number of
bargaining units in the health care industry to four: (1) professional
employees, (2) technical employees, (3) clerical employees, and (4)
maintenance and service employees. 172 The second proposal, made
by William Whelan, representing the California Hospital Associa-
tion, was to amend section 9(b) to read "appropriate bargaining
unit[s] [in the health care industry] shall be the largest reasonable
unit of employees of an employer.' ' 7 3 The Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Committee refused to adopt these proposals, though not
without some dissent. Senator Dominick voted against reporting the
bill out of the committee because he felt "the potential for recog-
nition of numerous bargaining units ... merits specific statutory
language." 174
The significance of the committee's refusal to adopt these -pro-
posals is inconclusive because there is no evidence of whether the
committee members viewed the proposals as "too rigid, too broad
172 This proposal was part of S. 2292 (never adopted) and would have amended section
9(b) to read:
[Tihe Board shall not decide that any unit in a health care institution is
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining which (i) includes pro-
fessional employees unless all of the professional employees employed by such
institution are included therein; or (ii) includes technical employees (as defined
from time to time by the Board) unless all of the technical employees employed
by such institution are included there; (iii) includes clerical employees unless
all of the clerical employees employed by such institution are included therein;
or (iv) includes service and maintenance employees - which shall be defined
to include all employees except (A) professional, technical, and clerical em-
ployees and (B) any individual employed as a guard ... unless all of the
service and maintenance employees employed by such institution are included
therein.
LEGISLATIV HISTORY, supra note 135, at 108-09; S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
CONG. REc. 6930, 6937-39 (daily ed. May 2, 1974).
M" LEGISLATvE HIsToRY, supra note 135, at 200.
7 S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3958; LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 135, at p. 52.
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or too narrow. ' 175 However, the committee probably refused to
adopt the proposals because it felt an amendment of section 9(b)
simply was unnecessary. It was unnecessary because Congress was
confident that the Board would exercise its discretion wisely in the
health care industry, just as it had in other industries. As Senator
Williams commented, "[t]he National Labor Relations Board has
shown good judgment in establishing appropriate units for the
purpose of collective bargaining, particularly in wrestling with units
in newly covered industries" and "the Board has, as a rule, tended
to avoid an unnecessary proliferation of collective bargaining un-
its.1 76 An amendment of section 9(b) also was unnecessary because
Congress had already decided to counter the potential results of
proliferation, i.e., increased strike potential leading to disruption
of patient care, with extensive anti-strike provisions. Secondary
concerns over other results of proliferation, i.e., wage whipsawing
and the like leading to increased cost of patient care, was to be left
to the Board to avoid in its informed discretion.
Congress' outright refusal to amend section 9(b), in conjunction
with the statement by Senator Williams, evidences a congressional
desire to rely upon the Board's proper exercise of its discretionary
powers to prevent excessive unit proliferation. Of much more sig-
nificance to the success of the Rules, however, Congress' refusal to
amend section 9(b) precludes the courts from attacking the Rules
on the basis of the admonition contained in the Committee Reports,
notwithstanding federal circuit court precedent to the contrary.
Established principles of statutory construction dictate that leg-
islative history should be relied upon by courts only to clarify
ambiguities in statutory language. The Supreme Court applied this
principle in Packard Motor,177 where it declined to look at legislative
history regarding whether "foremen" could constitute an appropri-
ate bargaining unit. The Court stated:
[W]e are invited to make a lengthy examination of views expressed
in Congress while this and later legislation was pending to show
that exclusion of foremen was intended. There is, however, no
ambiguity in this Act to be clarified by resort to legislative history,
either of the Act itself or ... proposals which failed to become
law. 78
175 See HMO Int'l, 678 F.2d at 808, quoted in Masonic Hall, 699 F.2d at 636.
16 LEG SLATwE HIsToRY, supra note 135, at 362-63, 120 CoNa. Rsc. 22,949 (July 11,
1974).
1- 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
171 Id. at 492.
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The rationale behind this reasoning is quite simple. If there are no
ambiguities to be resolved in Statute X, then courts interpreting the
meaning of Statute X need go no further than to examine the
language of the statute itself. 179
Since the Amendments failed to modify section 9(b) in any way,
they could not have created any ambiguities with respect to section
9(b). Consequently, the Committee Reports' admonition cannot
serve as the basis for denying enforcement of the Board's section
9(b) orders. As Judge Fairchild of the Seventh Circuit stated in his
dissent to Mary Thompson Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB,180 "the 'ad-
monition' is not appropriate for application by the courts in decid-
ing whether an order of the Board conforms to the statute or
whether the Board has abused the discretion conferred on it by the
statute."'
81
Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit, a well-known labor law
scholar, cited Judge Fairchild's dissent with approval in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 474 v. NLRB. 82 In
this case, the D.C. Circuit refused to enforce a Board order to
bargain with a unit that the Board had determined to be "appro-
priate" under the newly adopted "disparity-of-interests" test. The
court refused to enforce the order because, in the court's view, the
Board was erroneous in its conclusion in St. Francis I1183 that the
legislative history behind the 1974 Amendments compelled the Board
to adopt a "disparity-of-interests" test.'8 The court concluded no
such compulsion existed, stating: "Congress, in the final analysis,
decided against modifying section 9(b) of the Act; ... hence, the
same statutory standards that had existed before the enactment of
the 1974 Amendments with respect to unit determinations and
-n See, e.g., United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986);
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978); Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336,
1351 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980) (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
Id. at 864.
M 814 F.2d 697 (1987).
S 116 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1984). See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
In St. Francis Hospital 11I, 286 N.L.R.B. 123, 126 L.R.R.M. 1361 (1987), the
Board, on remand from the D.C. Circuit, insisted upon applying its "disparity-of-interests"
test, stating that the "disparity-of-interests" test was not adopted due to any mandate from
Congress. Rather, according to the Board, it was adopted in the Board's discretion in
response to congressional concerns over proliferation of bargaining units in the health care
industry. Moreover, the Board stated that the "disparity-of-interests" test is but a variation
of the "community-of-interests" test. Consequently, the Board affirmed its prior decision
under St. Francis II. See 126 L.R.R.M. at 1362; accord St. Vincent's Hospital, 285 N.L.R.B.
64, 125 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1987).
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certification procedures remained in the statute, entirely unmodi-
fied.,, 8 5
Judge Edwards cited the following Supreme Court statement as
support for the court's position: "[D]espite the [Committee] Re-
port's seeming endorsement of a per se rule, we are hesitant to rely
on that inconclusive legislative history either to supply a provision
not enacted by Congress . . ., or to define a statutory term enacted
by a prior Congress. 18 6 Judge Edwards emphasized that the con-
gressional admonition against undue proliferation was not made
part of the NLRA, that section 9(b) was never amended, and that
courts have no authority to enforce principles "gleaned solely from
legislative history that have no statutory reference point. 18 7 There-
fore, the admonition is not enforceable. 88
Recently, the First Circuit, the only circuit yet to address the
significance of the congressional admonition, explicitly adopted the
reasoning of Electrical Workers Local 474. In interpreting a statute,
the court refused to give any weight to the language of a committee
report that the committee had expressly declined to incorporate into
the statute. 8 9 The court held that to enforce the language would be
to treat the report as an "independent statutory source having the
force of law."' 9°
This is not to suggest, however, that the congressional admo-
nition is of no consequence whatsoever. On the contrary, the ad-
monition is a clear order to the Board to try to avoid undue
proliferation. The point is that the admonition is purely a matter
between Congress and the Board. Judge Fairchild echoed this in
his dissent to Mary Thompson Hospital: "Under the circumstances,
the 'admonition' and the Board's response to it seems to be a
matter between the Board and Congress. If the Board may be
thought by members of Congress to pay insufficient heed to the
'admonition', the Board may be courting a statutory change."' 9'
Judge Buckley, concurring in Electrical Workers Local 474,
argued that the congressional admonition serves a political rather
than a legal purpose:
183 Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d at 701.
"8 American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. at 846-47, cited in Elec. Workers, 814
F.2d at 712.
,8, Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d at 708.
88 Id. (noting the court was operating under an erroneous view of the law).
119 Paris v. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 843 F.2d 561, 569-70 (1st Cir.
1988).
Id. at 570.
621 F.2d at 864.
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* The agreement to include the report language was [not] an empty
gesture. To the contrary, there can be little doubt that the two
committees expected the Board to pay attention to their directive-
not because it had the force of law, but because agencies are not
given to ignoring the commands of potentates who control their
budgets and oversee their operations [not to mention appoint
them]. As counsel for one agency recently acknowledged in oral
argument before this court, while an instruction in an oversight
committee's report did not bind his agency legally, it did so "as
a practical matter." To underscore his point, he added: "Wle
are not talking law school enforcement, legal textbook arguments;
we're talking political reality here."'9
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the vast majority of federal
circuit courts continue to enforce the Committee Reports' language.
However, these courts have failed almost uniformly to address the
significance of Congress' failure to amend section 9(b) and inclusion
of the anti-strike provisions which make up the bulk of the amend-
ments.193 Indeed, of the ten circuits that enforce the admonition,
only half have engaged in their own analysis of the Amendments'
legislative history, with the other half relying instead upon their
sister courts' prior incomplete analysis.' 94
Only two circuits have discussed the implications of Congress'
failure to amend section 9(b) in 1974: the D.C. Circuit 95 and the
Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit advanced a reply to Judge
Fairchild's dissent in Mary Thompson Hospital, stating:
There is a question how much weight we should give the
committees' admonition. If Congress passes a statute, the com-
mittee reports may provide important evidence of legislative pur-
pose. But Congress did not enact any statute in 1974 dealing with
bargaining units. It did not amend section 9(b) .... On the other
hand, Congress did change the law in 1974-it put nonprofit
health care institutions under the National Labor Relations Act
for the first time in 27 years-and maybe the committees' state-
19 814 F.2d at 716, quoting Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
" But see NLRB v. Res/Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1470 (7th Cir. 1983); Frederick
Memorial Hosp., 691 F.2d at 193-94.
" Every circuit court except for the First and the D.C. Circuits enforces Board
implementation of the admonition. Of these ten circuits, the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh have not engaged in their own analysis. See, e.g., Walker City Med. Center,
722 F.2d at 1539 (11th Cir.); Watonwan Mem. Hosp., 711 F.2d at 850 (8th Cir.); Frederick
Mem. Hosp., 691 F.2d at 194 (4th Cir.); Vicksburg Hosp., Inc., 653 F.2d at 1075 (5th
Cir.); Presbyterian/St. Luke's Med. Center, 653 F.2d at 457 (10th Cir. 1981).
195 Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d 697. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
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ment should be viewed as a source of guidance to the courts in
interpreting the impact of the amendment on the whole Act; by
changing the coverage of a statute, you can also change its mean-
ing. 196
However, the court failed to cite any authority for this argument
and did not itself seem convinced by it. Instead, the court buttressed
its position by stating: "In any event, the circuits including ours
have treated the ... [admonition] as authoritative ... and we are
not disposed to reexamine the issue here; it would not in any event
change our result."' 97
Similarly, many commentators on the 1974 amendments have
simply just assumed the enforceability of the congressional admo-
nition. For example, in 1979, one commentator, cited numerously
by courts reviewing the legislative intent behind the Amendments,' 98
had no doubt about the admonition's enforceability, not because
of any principles of statutory construction, but because at that time
no one had questioned the admonition's significance: "The lan-
guage of the 1974 amendments themselves contained no mention of
the bargaining units issue . .. [However,] [n]either the Board, nor
any court of appeal, nor any party to pertinent litigation has
questioned the significance of the language contained in the com-
mittee reports with respect to bargaining unit proliferation."'' 99
Presently, however, the D.C. Circuit has raised substantial ques-
tions regarding the admonition's significance. And with respect to
the Board, it should not question the significance of the Committee
Reports' language, as it is a clear political directive to the Board.
Ironically, the Board's voluntary implementation of the admonition
in its first post-1974 health care decisions misled the original circuit
courts into requiring Board implementation thereafter .20 Moreover,
the Board has questioned the judicial significance of the admoni-
tion. The Board has stated that, by refusing to amend section 9(b),
"Congress, in the final analysis, left the matter of determination
of appropriate units to the Board ' 20' and that "[i]f Congress had
wanted to preclude the Board from using traditional criteria in
19 Res/Care, Inc., 705 F.2d at 1470.
197 Id.
"I Bumpass, supra note 38; see, e.g., HMO Int'l, 678 F.2d at 808 n.2; Res/Care, Inc.,
705 F.2d at 1470; Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir.
1982).
199 Bumpass, supra note 38, at 877.
20 See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
201 Mercy Hosp., 217 NLRB at 766 (1975).
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making unit determinations in the health care industry, it could
have easily amended Section 9(b) to so provide."
In the final analysis, the majority's position that the admonition
should be enforced because it is indicative of legislative intent is
oblivious to the principles enunciated in Electrical Workers Local
474.203 Moreover, it disregards Congress' demonstrated intent not
to invade Board discretion, but instead, to counter the effects of
proliferation with the statutory safeguards actually incorporated
into the Amendments.
Congressional intent has been frustrated by the courts. In effect,
the courts have attached statutory significance to an issue that
Congress determined did not warrant statutory treatment. Simply
put, Senators Taft and Dominick have accomplished through judi-
cial fiat what they could not through legislative consent.
In fact, as it stands today, the Board's application of the Rules
to determine appropriate units is rendered suspect by these circuit
court holdings. To successfully withstand judicial scrutiny in most
courts, the Rules must give the Board freedom to balance the
interests of employees against the public interest in non-proliferation
in each case and to demonstrate how each unit that is determined
to be appropriate reflects such a balancing of interests. The follow-
ing section assesses the extent to which the Rules allow the Board
such freedom and, consequently, the extent to which they should
be judicially accepted.
III. PROSPECTS FOR UNIFORM JuDICIAL ACCEPTANCE
The divergent circuit court interpretations of the 1974 Amend-
ments have resulted in three distinct standards: (1) the Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
hold that the Board may apply its traditional "community-of-
interests" criteria, so long as the Board explicitly weighs the public
interest in avoiding unit proliferation against employees' organiza-
tional rights;2°4 (2) the Ninth and Tenth Circuits25 interpret the
legislative history behind the 1974 Amendments to compel a rigid
Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 239 NLRB at 873.
21 814 F.2d at 709-14. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.




"disparity-of-interests" test2 6 and also require the Board to dem-
onstrate, in each case, how it considered the admonition;207 and (3)
the D.C. Circuit interprets the legislative history behind the 1974
Amendments to not compel any Board action20 8 and that Congress
implicitly approved continued use of the "community-of-interests"
approach to determine appropriate bargaining units in the health
care industry through its failure to amend section 9(b). 2°9
The Rules' guidelines for determining appropriate units, i.e.,
eight presumptively appropriate units, allow the Board to comply
with standard (1). The Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits have all held that the Board's duty to demonstrate explicit
consideration of the congressional admonition in each case can be
satisfied by citation to Board precedent in which the unit in question
was found to be appropriate. 210 The Fourth Circuit, in Frederick
Memorial Hospital,21" has held otherwise, 2 2 but also has indicated
that the result may be different if the precedent relied upon by the
Board involves a presumptively appropriate unit.2 13 (The Sixth and
Seventh Circuits have not considered the issue.2 14)
20 The "disparity-of-interests" test, in the form required by these two circuits, is rigid
in the sense that narrow units may only be approved by the Board if the differences between
employees in the unit sought and other employees are so great as virtually to preclude the
approval of broader units, i.e., "all professionals" and "all non-professionals." See, e.g.,
NLRB v. HMO Int'I/Cal. Medical Group Health Plan, 678 F.2d 806, 808, 812 n.17 (9th
Cir. 1982); Southwest Comm. Health Serv. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 611, 613 (10th Cir. 1984).
See generally supra note 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing "disparity-of-interests"
test).
2w See supra note 158.
201 See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
20 Intl Bd. of Elec. Workers Local 474, 814 F.2d at 711, 715. The court did indicate,
however, that the Board in its discretion under section 9(b), might switch to another standard
if it adequately explained the switch. Id. at 711-12 n.65.
210 See, e.g., St. John's Gen. Hosp. of Allegheny v. NLRB, 825 F.2d 740, 743 (3d
Cir. 1987) (Board citing precedent of business office clericals unit); NLRB v. Walker Co.
Medical Center, 722 F.2d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1984) (Board citing precedent of registered
nurses unit); Masonic Hall v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1983) (Board citing
precedent of service and maintenance unit); Watonwan Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d
848, 851 (8th Cir. 1983) (Board citing precedent of technical employees); Vicksburg Hosp.
v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981) (Board citing precedent of combined unit of
service, maintenance, and technical employees).
211 NLRB v. Frederick Memorial Hosp. Inc., 691 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1982).
212 Id.
211 The Fourth Circuit stressed that, "[iun Frederick Memorial the Board reiterated its
disavowal that a registered nurses' unit was per se appropriate," leaving room for the
Fourth Circuit to approve Board reliance on per se appropriate units. Id.
214 However, in NLRB v. Res/Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1470 (7th Cir. 1983), the
Seventh Circuit, in the absence of explicit consideration by the Board, cited to Board
precedent in upholding a Board determination of technical employee unit appropriateness.
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Accordingly, when determining appropriate units under the
Rules, reference to the rulemaking notice and comment period
should suffice as an explicit consideration of the congressional
admonition by the Board. In particular, the Board has stated that
during the rulemaking process it:
[H]as carefully considered the Congressional admonition against
proliferation set forth in the legislative history 1974 health care
amendments as well as its own strongly-held view that the number
of units found appropriate should not be so many as to lead to
a splintering of the workforce into the myriad of occupations and
professions found within the industry. The Board has examined
the units found appropriate to ensure they are not so numerous
as to create a never-ending round of bargaining sessions, and that
each unit represents truly distinctive interests and concerns. 21 5
Therefore, based upon the above considerations and current case
law in circuits adhering to standard (1), the guidelines should meet
with judicial acceptance in at least a majority of federal circuit
courts.
Likewise, the Rules' guidelines should withstand judicial scru-
tiny in the D.C. Circuit, a proponent of standard (3). Under this
standard, the congressional admonition in no way prevents the
Board from implementing the Rules' guidelines. 216 Therefore, so
long as the Rules are found to be valid under the NLRA217 and the
Board has adequately explained the reasons for their adoption,218
the Rules should pass muster in the D.C., and presumably the First,
Circuits .219
However, prospects for the Rules' acceptance in both the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits under standard (2) are bleak. It is not altogether
clear how the Ninth Circuit would regard the Rules' guidelines. On
one hand, the Ninth Circuit has held, in St. Francis Hospital of
Lynwood,22° that presumptions could be used by the Board if, at
2"1 53 Fed. Reg. 33,933 (1988). For the Board's discussion of each of the Rules'
separate units and the non-proliferation issue, see id. at 33,911 (registered nurses), 33,917
(physicians), 33,917 (other professionals), 33,918 (technicals), 33,920 (skilled maintenance),
33,924 (business office clericals).
216 See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
217 See Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d at 710.
2I See id. at 712 n.65; supra notes 85-134 and accompanying text; 52 Fed. Reg. 25,143-
145 (1987).
219 See notes 185-86 and accompanying text (First Circuit has indicated that it agrees
with D.C. Circuit's view that the congressional admonition has no impact on bargaining
unit determinations).
22 NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
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some prior occasion, the Board articulated the basis for the pres-
umptions such that the court could review their propriety in light
of the congressional admonition " ' and "if interested parties are
given the opportunity to effectively present evidence to rebut the
presumption[s].''m Moreover, this "basis" may consist of Board
precedent if such precedent adequately demonstrates a "disparity-
of-interests" between the unit deemed appropriate and other hos-
pital employees.? On the other hand, in HMO International,224 the
Ninth Circuit relied on St. Francis Hospital and held that the Board
cannot rely upon precedent in articulating the "disparity-of-inter-
ests" between the unit determined appropriate and other hospital
employees.225
In light of St. Francis Hospital, which specifically approves the
use of presumptions to demonstrate a "disparity-of-interests," and
HMO International, which specifically disallows the Board's use of
precedent to demonstrate a "disparity-of-interests," it is unclear
how the Ninth Circuit would react to the Rules' guidelines. Nev-
ertheless, as HMO International is an extension of St. Francis
Hospital and the latter clearly indicates that presumptions are ac-
ceptable if certain requirements are met, the Ninth Circuit should
approve of the guidelines.
There is no question, however, that based upon current prece-
dent, the Tenth Circuit would not condone application of the Rules'
guidelines. "We hold that requiring health care industry employers
to bear the burden of producing evidence that limited bargaining
units are more inappropriate than broader bargaining units runs
contrary to the Congress' admonition."' Furthermore, the Second
Circuit, though not adhering to the "disparity-of-interests" stan-
dard, z27 concurs in this respect. 228 The Second Circuit also has
22 Id. at 416 n.14.
Id. at 416.
223 "[A] problem in this case is that the Board relies on the presumption established
in its Mercy decision, and the Mercy opinion is woefully inadequate as to the facts which
support the Board's reliance." Id. at 416 n.14.
NLRB v. HMO Int'I/Cal. Medical Group Health Plan, 678 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.
1982).
2 See id. at 810. "It is apparent that the only mention of the nonproliferation mandate
was an interpretive gloss placed on an NLRB decision, the principle of which has been
judicially invalidated for failure to implement congressional intent." Id. at 810 n.8.
22 Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 457 (10th Cir.
1981).
22 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
2n Long Island Jewish Hosp. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1982). "[W]e believe
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indicated that Board reliance upon precedent (and therefore, pre-
sumably, reference to the rulemaking process) may not be sufficient
to demonstrate consideration of the congressional admonition. 29
In addition, it is quite possible that some or most of the circuit
courts may refuse to enforce the Rules because the Rules' eight
appropriate units constitute prima facie "undue" proliferation. It
is true that the Board sanctioned and the courts enforced each of
the Rules' eight units before the Rules' adoption.20 However, the
Rules do not foreclose the possibility of eight units in a single
hospital,21 and the courts have never been presented with that
situation. Some negative circuit court reaction to such unit prolif-
eration would be inevitable.
CONCLUSION
The only hope for unanimous judicial acceptance of the Rules
is for the Supreme Court to decide the weight the admonition should
be given by reviewing courts. The congressional admonition "joker"
must be removed from the deck of judicial review.232 The irony of
the Board's present predicament is such, however, that if the Su-
preme Court were to grant certiorari and rightfully put asunder the
notion of the admonition's enforceability, then the Board's ultimate
objective for rulemaking no longer would exist. In fact, if the
Supreme Court had come to the succor of the Board earlier, then
the Board's continued adherence to the "two-tier" approach,2 3 an
approach strikingly similar to the Rules' process for determining
health care units, might well have obviated the need to engage in
rulemaking altogether. Additionally, the other two Board reasons
for engaging in rulemaking would not be so compeUing. 234 As stated
by Board member Johansen:
that [employee organization rights] must be weighed against the public interest in nonpro-
liferation without the introduction of burden-shifting presumptions .... Because the use
of the single-facility presumption may have improperly tipped the balance in favor of
certification, we must reverse and remand .... Id.
2" See Masonic Hall, 699 F.2d at 632.
2" See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,903 (1988).
23 See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
232 The congressional admonition was referred to by the Seventh Circuit in 1983 as a
"joker in the deck" that has caused the Board much difficulty in developing a consistent
standard of health care unit determinations. NLRB v. Res/Case, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1469
(7th Cir. 1983).
231 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Contrary to the stated expectations of my colleagues, setting
unit configurations by rulemaking will not in fact substantially
reduce the amount of litigation in this area. It may serve to change
part of the focus of that litigation, while at the same time creating
more. The amount of evidence produced in rulemaking is not the
point. The difficulties encountered over the last several years have
not been for lack of evidence. Rather, they have revolved around
differing interpretations of the statute and, particularly, the leg-
islative history and the deference to be accorded the Board and
its expertise in its role as the primary decision maker under the
Act. I do not see that announcing rules by administrative fiat will
resolve the divergent views on these fundamental questions. We
still will not have obtained a definitive resolution of the basic
issues which is so sorely needed.25
Perhaps the Rules are an attempt by the Board to force the
Supreme Court's hand. The Court has refused more than once to
resolve the proliferation issue.23 6 The time is well past due, however,
for the Court to intercede in this matter. The Court should grant
certiorari and confirm the validity of the Rules in relation to the
NLRA.237 In doing so, however, the Court must confirm the ra-
tionale of Electrical Workers Local 474231 and thereby send a signal
to the circuit courts that it is not within their domain to enforce
the admonition. Conversely, a Court decision vindicating the circuit
courts' enforcement of the admonition inevitably would spell doom
for the prospects of the Board's latest and most ambitious attempt
to establish a consistent standard for the determination of appro-
priate bargaining units in the health care industry.
John Robert Shelton*
2 53 Fed. Reg. 33,935 (1988).
26 The U.S. Supreme Court has twice refused to grant certiorari on this issue. See
NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 (1979);
Long Island College Hosp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
996 (1978). Also, the Solicitor General refused to file petitions for certiorari, despite the
Board's request that he do so, in NLRB v. Frederick Memorial Hosp., 691 F.2d 191 (4th
Cir. 1982) and NLRB v. HMO International, 678 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982).
2' See supra notes 85-134 and accompanying text.
M See supra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
* The author would like to thank Professor Alvin Goldman for his invaluable time
and insight and for sharing his overall knowledge in this field of law; but for his assistance
and guidance, this paper could never have been completed.
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